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NOTES AND COMMENTS

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE USE OF MIDDLE
INCOME PUBLIC HOUSING RENTALS TO SUBSIDIZE
LOW INCOME PUBLIC HOUSING
The state legislature of Massachusetts recently requested
an advisory opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court concerning the constitutionality of a proposed public housing
bill.' In essence, the proposed bill provided the public housing would include both middle income and low income units.
Rentals provided from the middle income units could be
set at a figure so as to provide a profit to subsidize the low
income units. The proposed bill declared a public need for
low income housing, but made no such provision in regard
to middle income housing. In its advisory opinion, the Massachusetts Court limited its ruling to the question of whether
there was a use of public funds for a public purpose. The
court said that it was not clear that the funds spent on the
middle income housing would be for the public purpose, and,
therefore, held the bill to be unconstitutional.2
The Oklahoma legislature, in its 1965 session, passed
legislation providing for public housing for low income individuals or family units.3 The Oklahoma statute does not provide a fixed manner in which this housing is to be provided,
but rather establishes local housing authorities. Under this
enabling act it is entirely conceivable that a housing program such as that proposed by the Massachusetts legislature
will be suggested by the state or local housing authority.
A few observations concerning current judicial thinking
along these lines would, therefore, be of value.
There is little doubt but that the Massachusetts court
saw the point of contention in the proposed bill before it.
Providing low income public housing where there is a need
for such is constitutionally well settled.4 The Massachusetts
'Opinion of the Justices, 219 N.E.2d 18 (Mass. 1966).
2

Id. at 26.

34 Okla. Stat. tit. 63, §§ 1051-82 (Supp. 1965).
Hogue v. Housing Authority of North Little Rock, 144 S.W.2d
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court agreed with this premise.5 The court did not agree,
however, that the middle income housing use to subsidize
the low income housing was constitutional." For isolating this
single issue in its review, the Massachusetts decision is not
sound and a critical analysis is warranted.
The United States Supreme Court has extended its definition of "public purpose" to the ultimate point where, today, there are no definable limits. In 1908 the Court said
that what a state tribunal had said to be for the public purpose, be it express or implied, would not be upset by the
Court except in rare circumstances. 7 What served the public purpose of a state as determined by state courts would
not be challenged by the Court unless clearly improper.
In 1946, in a case involving the Tennessee Valley Authority,
the Court looked at how a legislative enactment should be
interpreted when its overall proposal is for the public purpose." The TVA, in the process of filling a reservoir, had
flooded a highway going to a certain area owned by private
individuals. To replace the flooded road with a new one
would have cost in excess of one million dollars, but to acquire the land cut off by the flooding of the road by eminent
domain would cost about one-third that of the new road.
A proposal to condemn the land cut off was attacked by
the landowners as not being within the public purpose as
provided by the TVA legislation. The Court, however, said
that one inseparable transaction could not be divided into
separate units.9 The Court pointed out that, "we view the
entire transaction as a single integrated effort to carry on
congressionally authorized functions." 0 When the landown49 (Ark. 1940); Cremer v. Peoria Housing Authority, 399 Ill.
579, 78 N.E.2d 276 (1948); Redfern v. Board of Comm'rs, 137
N.J.L. 356, 59 A. 2d 641 (1948).
5Supra note 1, at 25.
6Id. at 26.
7Hairston v. Danville & Western Ry. Co., 208 U.S. 598 (1908).
8 United States v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546 (1946).
9
Id. at 552-53.
10 Id.
at 553.
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ers in that case attacked the taking of their land by the TVA,
they were attempting to separate inseparable transactions
undertaken by the TVA. And this is what the Massachusetts court has done. The proposed bill was for an end admittedly within the public interest - suitable low income
public housing. The bill was a package plan, so to speak.
The TVA could have constructed a new road to the stranded
land, but chose not to do so. The Supreme Court called this
transaction inseparable from the overall plan and the proposed Massachusetts bill falls within the same category.
There is a section in the Oklahoma public housing enabling act for which this proposition of an inseparable transaction might be applied. The act provides that: ". . . no
authority shall construct or operate any housing project for
profit, or as a source of revenue to the city or county.""u
"Housing project" is defined as, ..... any work or undertaking . .. to provide or assist in providing ... living accommodations for persons of low income...."u To attack
a proposed housing plan under this enabling legislation
as providing for construction of a profit making project
would be to attempt to separate an inseparable transaction.
In the TVA case, the Supreme Court said to look at the
project as a whole and not to each portion making up the
whole. To argue that middle income housing is provided to
make a profit and thus outside the scope of the act is to
break up the overall transaction. The "housing project" is
the entire integrated plan. The entire plan must be shown
to be outside the public purpose, not individual pieces of
the plan.
In 1954, in Berman v. Parker,the Supreme Court ruled
that "public purpose" is broad and encompassing.13 That
case involved legislation providing for slum clearance in the
District of Columbia. Petitioners' property was not a slum
location, but a department store. In allowing condemnation
tit. 63, § 1062 (Supp. 1965).
tit. 63, § 1054 (i) (Supp. 1965).
348 U.S. 26 (1954).

11 ORLA. STAT.
12
OKLA. STAT.
13
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of the petitioners' property to fulfill the overall scope of the
total slum clearance plan, the Court said of public purposes:
...an attempt to... trace its outer limits is fruitless ...
The definition is essentially the product of legislative
determinations addressed to the purposes of government, purposes neither abstractly nor historically capable of complete definition. Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the
public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh
conclusive. In such cases, the legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs to be
served by social legislation, whether it be the Congress
legislating concerning the District of Columbia
or the
4
States legislating concerning local affairs.1
The Court's statement is clear-what the legislature may
do for a public purpose is practically incapable of limitation
and the legislature is the primary determining body of what
serves the public purpose in social legislation. The Massachusetts court has attempted to impose its determination of
the public purpose on the legislature. Certainly it is within
its judicial province to do this. But is it proper under modern constitutional jurisprudence?
It must be noted that state courts do not necessarily follow the guidelines set by the Supreme Court for the federal
government. But the state courts must and do look to the
public purpose of legislation to determine its constitutionality. A similar situation to the problem under consideration is the state's aid to private industry to encourage it to
build within the state. The mere attraction of industry to
a state has been held to be for the public purpose in order
to allow the state to loan public funds to entering industry."
Industry will bring more tax revenue into the state and provide employment for residents of the state. Financial aid to
industry has been upheld on the basis that the providing of
14 Id. at 32.
'r Roan v. Connecticut Industrial Bldg. Comm'n, 150 Conn. 333,
189 A.2d 399 (1963); Opinion of the Justices, 169 A.2d 634
(N.H. 1961); Roe v. Kervick, 42 N.J. 191, 199 A.2d 834 (N.J.
1964).
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expanded employment of residents by industry is a public
purpose for which public funds may be spent.' Certainly
mere aid to industry alone is not a public, but a private purpose. But when the transaction is considered as a whole,
the public purpose is evident and the parts are inseparable
from the whole.
As has been stated before, to provide public housing of
some type when needed by the public is settled as constitutional when public funds are spent for its construction.
In the proposed Massachusetts bill there was a professed
need for low income housing. Since public funds may be
spent for public needs, they could be used directly in financing low income housing without running afoul of any constitutional prohibitions. The argument is logical that the
fact that the legislature has chosen to provide for public
needs by using middle income housing profits to finance in
part low income housing does not necessarily take those
funds out of the category of funds spent for a public purpose.
The public purpose is low income public housing for which
there is a need. What is the public purpose in building middle income housing when there is no need for that type of
housing in and of itself? The answer is obvious. The public
purpose served by middle income housing is providing subsidies to support low income public housing. The parts cannot be separated from the whole of the legislative purpose.
The most important point is that the legislation is to
be considered constitutional unless it has no reasonable
basis.17 This logically follows the rule that what is for the
public purpose is for the legislature to decide, not the judiciary. This point weighs most heavily of all upon the determination of the constitutionality of a public expenditure dependent upon whether it is for the public purpose. In an
16 Roe v. Kervick, 42 N.J. 191, 199 A.2d 834 (1964).
17 Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1936);
McClelland v. Mayor and Council of Wilmington, 159 A.2d
596 (Dela. 1960); Hill v. City of Summit, 64 N.J. Super. 522,
166 A.2d 610 (1960); Torizan v. Saunders, 97 N.W.2d 586
(S.D. 1959).
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advisory opinion to the legislature concerning a bill under
consideration to buy industrial facilities and then transfer
them to private or public utilities to promote growth of the
state, cities, towns and villages, the New Hampshire Supreme
Court pointed out that there was no assurance that this was
in the public interest, and held it unconstitutional. 1 8 In a later
advisory opinion by the same court concerning a revised
version of the bill, providing that the governor of the state
and a council would determine if the public purpose would
be served in each transaction under the bill, the court found
it was constitutional so long as the governor and the council
found that the individual transaction was for the public
purpose.' 9 Thus, the court said that it did not need to pass
upon the public purpose problem in each transaction as the
governor would determine such purpose under the bill.
This gives the legislature and the governor the power to
determine if something is within the public purpose without
the consent of the court so long as it falls within the act. The
legislature need only say an act is within the public purpose
or that some agency is to determine that acts under the bill
will be for the public purpose, and generally the court will
not disturb such legislative action.
Of course, arguments will be made that middle income
housing is unconstitutional. It could be argued that middle
income housing has no public purpose per se; that there
is no public need for it. Critics may say that the dominant
purpose of the middle income housing is not public purpose. But to answer these arguments and others that may
arise, one need only point to consideration of the transaction
as a whole and not of parts, and the legislation must be construed as constitutional if at all possible. The Oklahoma
Supreme Court, to decide such a question as this, should
look to the same propositions. The Oklahoma court in the
syllabus of one case pointed out that the Oklahoma constitution vested the legislature with the supreme power to
enact laws, and unless plainly and clearly within express
18 Opinion of the Justices, 207 A.2d 574 (N.H. 1965).
19 Opinion of the Justices, 209 A.2d 474 (N.H. 1965).
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constitutional prohibitions and limitations, acts of it should
be upheld. 0 In another case the Oklahoma court points out
that the state legislature is supreme, except as limited by
express constitutional provisions. Any doubt as to the validity of a legislative act must be in favor of the act's constitutionality. 21 There is sufficient authority, both from prior
Oklahoma Supreme Court decisions and decisions from other
jurisdictions to allow the Oklahoma court to make the modern decision in a case such as the one under discussion.
It is apparent that a housing bill such as this would have
no problem being found constitutional in a federal court.
Under the prevailing constitutional principles the Massachusetts' opinion cannot be supported. Not only does it fail
to meet these standards, the Massachusetts opinion also
deters socially progressive programs. Oklahoma, in administering its new Public Housing Act, would do well to follow
the method of construction favored by the United States
Supreme Court.
Craig Blackstock

Tate v. Logan, 362 P.2d 607, 671 (Okla. 1961).
21Application of County Courthouse Building Comm'n of
Stephens County, 403 P.2d 501 (Okla. 1965).
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